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Abstract This paper analyzes alternative policies for controlling stochastic
externalities, considering both the incentive and the risk-sharing effects of
each. When polluter actions are unobservable so that regulation is not pos-
sible, alternative liability rules including zero, partial, and full liability are
compared. When actions are observable, then regulation is possible, and the
use of regulation is compared to the use of liability. The principal-agent par-
adigm provides the analytical approach used to determine the efficient policy
choice. The effect of the availability of insurance is also addressed. This paper
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for the control
of stochastic marine pollution.
Introduction
Many forms of pollution are stochastic in the sense that they result from accidental
spills or releases rather than continuous (intentional) emissions. These include
the highly publicized problems resulting from spills of hazardous substances dur-
ing transport by land or sea and the contamination of groundwater supplies by
unintentional releases from landfills. Recognition of these forms of stochastic
externalities has given rise to questions concerning their control. For example,
Just and Zilberman (1979) compare the effects of lump sum taxes and subsidies
on a firm's incentive to undertake safety. The control of oil spills through the use
of liability rules has been studied by Conrad (1980) and by Opaluch and Grigalunas
(1984). A more general treatment of the control of accidents appears in a series
of papers by Shavell (1980, 1982, 1984a, 1984b).
The choice of any policy for controlling stochastic externalities generally has
two effects: an incentive effect and a risk-sharing effect. The incentive effect
provides the impetus for firms to take actions to increase safety and thus reduce
the probability of accidents. The risk-sharing effect stems from the fact that the
policy choice dictates an allocation of risk, and the amount of risk that parties
must bear can have welfare effects. Although the incentive effects of alternative
policies have been well-recognized, in general the risk-sharing effects have been
ignored. (An exception is Shavell (1982)). However, recent liability cases and
their ripple effects suggest that risk may be a very important consideration in
decisions regarding activities that could impose substantial externalities. Evidence
of this is provided by recent events in the market for liability insurance.' Thus,
' Large settlements in recent liability cases have caused premiums for liability insurance
to increase sharply. In some cases coverage has been eliminated. In response, many firms
are reducing or withdrawing the provision of certain goods and services because of the
inability to secure liability coverage at a reasonable cost. See the Wall Street Journal,
January 21, 1986, page 37.
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the allocation of risk under alternative policies would appear to be an important
factor in the choice of a control policy.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze alternative policies for controlling
stochastic externalities in terms of both their incentive and their risk-sharing ef-
fects. The policies that are considered depend upon whether the actions of the
polluters that affect the probability of a given pollution event are observable or
not. When actions are observable, regulation of those actions is possible, and the
policies considered include regulation and full liability (i.e. ex post liability for
the full amount of damages). However, when actions are unobservable, regulation
is not possible. Instead liability rules can be used to induce safety, and we consider
alternative rules including zero, partial, and full ex post liability. The paradigm
that provides the basis for the analysis is the principal-agent model that is popular
in studies of sharecropping, alternative wage contracts, and the organizational
structure of firms. The relevance of this model to problems of environmental
externalities was first noted by Shavell (1979a).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the pure risk sharing
problem (without incentives effects) is presented to provide an understanding of
the role of liability rules in the Pareto efficient allocation of risk. The following
section presents the model for the case where actions are unobservable and thus
incentives for safety must be provided. This section highlights the basic tradeoff
between risk-sharing and incentives when polluters are risk averse. The fourth
section compares the use of regulation and ex post liability when the polluter's
actions are observable (and can thus be regulated). An interim summary of the
results is then presented, followed by a discussion of how those results and con-
clusions would change if private insurance were available to spread risk. Finally,
some limitations of the analysis that suggest directions for further research and
implications of the analysis for the control of stochastic marine pollution are
discussed.
Liability and Risk-Sharing Without Incentive Problems
Embodied in many federal statutes is an attempt to control environmental pol-
lution through imposing strict liability for damages on the responsible parties
(Opaluch (1984)).^ In addition, strict liability is often imposed through state or
federal courts under the law of torts. Under strict liability, those responsible for
the activity that is causing an environmental problem pay the costs of clean-up
and compensation regardless of whether or not they were negligent in their ac-
tions. This approach should encourage all parties involved in the generation, trans-
portation, and disposal of polluting substances to take steps to reduce the pos-
sibility of environmental damage from their use (Opaluch and Grigalunas (1984)).
^ Liability is often limited to certain types of costs. For example, liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) is
limited to clean-up costs, other costs of remedial actions, and damages to public natural
resources. In particular, it does not include damages to third parties. Dollar limitations on
liability exist under many statutes as well, including CERCLA, the Price Anderson Act
(governing nuclear accidents), and several laws governing marine pollution (See final
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In addition to internalizing the pollution externality,^ strict liability also implies
a particular allocation of risk. Risk arises from the fact that future damages are
uncertain and thus are viewed from the present as a random variable. A strict
liability rule places the risk associated with the level of future damages on the
responsible parties. Although this has advantages in terms of providing proper
prevention incentives (see third section), it is not necessarily an optimal allocation
of the risk.
The economic assessment of optimal risk-sharing is usually considered within
the context of the more general problem of risk-sharing and incentives. This
broader problem, embodied in what has generally been referred to as the principal-
agent problem, has been studied by many authors, including Stiglitz (1974), Ross
(1973), Shavell (1979a), Holmstrom (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983). The
analysis is generally in the context of sharecropping, labor contracts, insurance
contracts, or the organizational structure of firms. In addition, Shavell (1979a)
discusses its applicability to a comparison of strict liability and negligence stan-
dards in controlling stochastic externalities such as oil spills. Leland (1978) and
Sutinen (1980) have used a similar model to analyze leasing policies for extractive
resources. Our purpose here is to consider the application of the general frame-
work used in this model to the question of risk-sharing for stochastic pollution.
In this context, the model takes the following form. Let c denote the value of
damages associated with a future pollution event. From the present perspective,
c is viewed as a random variable since future damages are not known. In this
discussion of optimal risk-sharing, we assume that the distribution of c is not
affected by the actions of the polluter. This assumption is relaxed in the following
section where the problem of incentives is considered. Let f(c) be the amount
paid by the polluter"* for damages. The costs that must be borne by the victim (or
by the public sector) are equal to c-f(c). Note that if f(c) is constant, i.e. inde-
pendent of c, then in a legal sense polluters have no ex post "liability" since the
amount they pay does not depend on the damages actually incurred. The payment
scheme is instead analogous to an ex ante payment to a trust fund to be used for
clean-up and compensation. Alternatively, if f(c) # 0 then polluters are subject
to at least some ex post liability, with f(c) = 1 implying full liability.^ Thus, the
choice of f'(c) determines the allocation of risk between polluters and victims. It
is important to note, however, that it does not define the distribution of costs (or,
more precisely, expected utility) between the two parties. For any given f(c), the
distribution of costs can be adjusted through changes in an ex ante, i.e. fixed,
payment. Thus, even though polluters face no risk under a zero liability rule where
f'(c) = 0, this does not necessarily mean that they are better off than they would
be under a full liability system, since the full liability rule could be accompanied
by a smaller fixed payment than the zero liability rule.
' See Opaluch (1984) and Shavell (1984a, 1984b) for discussions of some limitations on
the use of liability rules to internalize externalities.
'' We assume that there is a single responsible party to avoid the problem of assigning
liability and the potential for free-riding in the multiple polluter case. For a discussion of
free-riding in principal-agent models, see Holmstrom (1982) and Segerson (forthcoming).
' We use the term "full liability" to refer to a liability rule where polluters must pay the
full amount of damages. Throughout the paper, our use of the term liability refers to strict
liability, which may or may not be for the full amount of damages.178 Kathleen Segerson
To determine the efficient liability rule,* let V(vo - c + f(c)) represent the
victim's utility function and let U(uo - f(c)) represent the polluter's utility func-
tion, where Vo and Uo are the initial wealth levels of the victim and the polluter
respectively. Then Pareto optimal risk-sharing is given by a liability rule f that
satisfies
max EV(vo - c + f(c)) subj. to EU(uo - f(c)) > U (1)
where U is the polluter's reservation level of expected utility, given the choice
of the utility function U. The first order conditions for the optimal f require that
V'(vo - c + f(c)) = \U'(uo - f(c)) (2)
where \ s 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint in (1).'' Equation (2)
defines the optimal level of risk-sharing between the victim and the polluter if the
associated second order conditions are met.
To see the implications of (2) for the first best liability rule, differentiate (2)
with respect to c and solve for f(c) to get
This highlights the importance of the second derivatives of the utility functions,
which reflect the attitudes toward risk. For example, consider the implications
of (3) in the context of the following alternative cases.
Case 1: Risk Averse Victim (V" < 0). Risk Neutral Polluter (U" = 0). In this
case, (3) implies that f'(c) = 1, and thus f(c) = c + k for some constant k. As
noted above, this corresponds to a full liability rule since any increases in damages
are borne fully by the polluter. Thus, when the polluter is risk neutral but the
victim is not (so that risk is costly to the victim but not to polluters), then full
liability results in optimal risk-sharing with the polluter bearing the full risk as-
sociated with future damages. Polluters might be expected to be risk-neutral if
potential damages are small relative to the operations of the firm. For example,
if the polluter is a large, diversified company with many stockholders, it may be
able to spread risks sufficiently to justify risk neutral behavior if potential damages
are not too large. However, if the victims are individuals who suffer either mon-
etary or serious health effects as a result of contamination, they will not generally
be able to spread those risks. In this case, the assumption of risk neutral polluters
but risk averse victims seems appropriate.
Case 2: Risk Neutral Victim (V" = 0), Risk Averse Polluter (U" < 0). This
* Pareto efficiency is only one possible criterion for choosing a liability rule. Other con-
siderations such as fairness and precedent could be used as well and are probably more
frequently used in practice. However, here we limit our consideration to the economic
efficiency objective, recognizing that distributional objectives could be handled through
adjustments in U.
^ Because f is a contingency rule, i.e., it gives the level of liability contingent on a given
realization of the random variable c, the first order conditions depend upon realized mar-
ginal utilities rather than expected marginal utilities. See Raiffa (1968) for a more detailed
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assumption implies that f (c) = 0 so that f(c) = k. In other words, it is optimal
in terms of risk-sharing for the polluter to pay a constant amount that is inde-
pendent of the actual realized damages. Under this rule, polluters have no ex post
liability. They are shielded from the uncertainty associated with future damages,
and all of the risk is borne by the victim. This is optimal in this case because risk
represents a cost to risk averse polluters but not to a risk neutral victim. It might
be appropriate to think of victims as risk neutral if individuals are fully compen-
sated by the government for any damages they incur so that the public sector
assumes their risk, and the public sector can spread risks sufficiently across tax-
payers (Arrow and Lind (1970)).* Risk aversion on the part of polluters might be
appropriate if potential damages borne by an individual firm are very large.
Case 3: Both Victim and Polluter are Risk Averse (V" < 0, U" < 0). In this
case, 0 < f(c) < 1. This implies that f(c) # c + k and f(c) T^ k. In other words,
neither the polluter nor the victim bears the full risk. Instead, risk is shared be-
tween them. The polluter is liable for some portion of realized costs, but he is
not fully responsible for incremental changes in c. Of course, the optimal allo-
cation of the risk between the two risk averse parties will depend upon the relative
magnitudes of U" and V". In the special case where both U and V are quadratic,
a fixed apportionment scheme (f(c) = a for some constant a) is efficient, i.e.,
each party's ex post payment should be a fixed proportion of the damages re-
gardless of the level of those damages. Under more general utility functions,
however, the efficient apportionment will depend on the level of damages.
Case 4: Both the Victim and Polluter are Risk Neutral (V" = U" = 0). In this
case, a unique optimal risk-sharing rule does not exist. Since risk does not rep-
resent a cost to either the polluter or the victim, the allocation of risk does not
have any welfare effects.
In summary, the pareto optimal rule for allocating risk between the victim and
the polluter (in the absence of incentive problems) depends upon their risk atti-
tudes. A full liability rule will yield optimal risk-sharing if polluters are risk neutral
but not if they are risk averse. Risk aversion by polluters implies that, ceteris
paribus, the victim should bear some (if he is also risk averse) or all (if he is risk
neutral) of the risk associated with the level of future damages.^
Liability and Risk-Sharing with Incentive Problems
The above analysis assumes that the distribution of the random variable repre-
senting damages is not affected by the actions of polluters, and thus the only issue
of concern is the allocation of risk. In reality, the behavior of polluters can often
affect the probability of a given magnitude of damages. The appropriate policy
response to this effect depends on whether the preventive actions are observable
by the regulatory agency. If those actions are observable and can be monitored
** See Fisher (1973) for some limitations to the Arrow and Lind argument.
' Note that, if the public can be viewed as risk neutral but individuals are risk averse,
then this result is exactly opposite of the current situation under CERCLA. CERCLA
holds firms liable for damages incurred by the public sector, thus shielding the possibly
risk neutral public from risk. However, damages to private property or individual health
or welfare are not covered, thus exposing risk averse individuals to substantial risk unless
they are able to obtain compensation under common law. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for noting this apparent contradiction.180 Kathleen Segerson
(and thus non-compliance detected), then direct regulation is possible. When pre-
ventive care cannot be easily monitored, then direct regulation is not possible,
but an indirect incentive mechanism such as a liability rule can be used to induce
a certain level of abatement or care. In this section, the above analysis is modified
to include the need to induce firms to undertake safety measures when direct
monitoring is not possible. In the following section, the possibility of using direct
regulation is considered.
Let a be the level of safety or preventive care taken by the polluter and let
g(c,a) be the probability density function of damages given a.'° In this case, the
Pareto efficient payment scheme is given by the solution to
max EV(vo - c + f(c)) (4a)
{a.f{)}
subject to EU(uo - a - f(c)) > U (4b)
EUa = 0 (4c)
where the second constraint states that the polluter chooses the level of a that
maximizes his expected utility. This constraint refiects the need to motivate the
polluter to undertake abatement. This problem can be written more explicitly as
max /V(vo - c + f(c))g(c,a)dc (5a)
{a.f}
subject to /U(uo - a - f(c))g(c,a)dc > U (5b)
;[U(uo - a - f(c))ga - U'(uo - a - f(c))g(c,a)]dc = 0 (5c)
where ga = dg/da. The optimal fee schedule must then satisfy the following
condition:
V = \U' + (x[(ga/g)U' - U"] (6)
where |JL is the multiplier on the second constraint. As long as |i, 5^ 0, i.e., there
is a need to provide an incentive, this condition differs from the condition for
optimal risk-sharing given in (3). In other words, because of the need to motivate
polluters indirectly to take care when their actions are not observable, in general
the optimal fee schedule will differ from the one that would generate optimal risk-
sharing. This makes intuitive sense when one thinks, for example, about the spe-
cial case of risk averse polluters and risk neutral victims. In this case, optimal
risk-sharing would imply that victims bear all of the risk, i.e., that the polluters
not be subject to any ex post liability. However, in the absence of any liability
(or enforceable regulations), polluters have no incentive to be cautious. Thus,
there is a trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives; greater liability implies
greater behavioral incentives but also greater risk for polluters.
This trade-off disappears in special cases. For example, when polluters are
risk neutral, i.e., U" = 0, one can show that (x = 0, and thus the problem reduces
'" Note that g may also depend on the safety decisions of other firms if there are multiple
contributors to the potential threat. This would not change the results qualitatively, pro-
vided that each firm takes the decisions of all other firms as given.The Control of Stochastic Externalities 181
to one of just optimal risk-sharing. In this case, full liability is optimal, since it
provides the correct incentive for precaution while placing all of the risk on the
risk neutral party. Likewise, when ga = 0, i.e., when polluters' actions do not
influence the probability distribution of c, then again the problem reduces to
optimal risk-sharing since polluters will choose a zero level of precaution re-
gardless of the fee schedule.
In general, however, neither full liability nor zero liability (i.e., a fixed payment
that is independent of actual damages) is optimal when considering both risk-
sharing and incentives. Instead, as long as polluters are risk averse, a system of
partial liability is preferred. The extent of that partial liability would depend on
the polluter's and victim's risk aversion characteristics and the strength of the
incentive effect.
Ex Ante Regulation vs. Ex Post Full Liability
In the previous section, the assumption that the actions of polluters were unob-
servable implied that direct regulation was not possible, i.e., the fee paid by
polluters could not be a function of a. However, if a is observable, then direct
regulation is possible. In particular, a fee schedule of the form
f(c) = 0 if a > a* g^
00 if a < a*
would be equivalent to requiring the firm to abate a* and then absolving the firm
of any liability for actual damages incurred." Thus, the basic framework outlined
in the previous section can also be used to compare the use of ex ante regulation
and ex post liability in controlling stochastic externalities.
Previous comparisons of these two approaches (e.g., Shavell (1984a, 1984b),
White and Wittman (1983), Johnson, Kolstad and Ulen (1986)) have assumed that
all parties are risk neutral. They thus focus on the incentive effects of the two
alternatives and ignore the risk-sharing effects. In this case the relative desirability
ofthe two approaches depends upon the assumptions that are made about system
imperfections. For example, Shavell (1984a) argues that the ability of polluters
to escape successful suits or avoid full payment for damages because of asset
availability tends to make regulation more desirable, while the inability of regu-
lators to distinguish ex ante among firms threatening different levels of harm tends
to favor the use of ex post liability rules. Johnson, Kolstad and Ulen (1986) con-
sider the impact of evidentiary uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the legal stan-
dard to which a potential polluter would be held in court. In these cases, the
inability of the regulation and liability approaches to ensure an efficient level of
The question of whether compliance with regulations issued pursuant to environmental
statutes preempts common law used to impose liability is the subject of considerable de-
bate. Some argue that regulatory standards simply provide a minimum set of standards
for conduct, while others argue that the creation of a comprehensive regulatory program
should be viewed as an attempt by Congress to provide a substitute for common law. The
debate was fueled by the 1982 Supreme Court decision in the case of Milwaukee vs. The
State of Illinois. (For a discussion of the concerns and issues regarding that decision see
U.S. Senate Hearing 98-247.) Recently, several bills have been introduced in Congress
that would significantly reduce the liability of firms that are in compliance with regulations.182 Kathleen Segerson
precaution stems from some assumed imperfection in the regulatory or legal sys-
tem. In the absence of these imperfections, the two alternatives would be equally
efficient. This result does not hold, however, when the assumption of risk neu-
trality is relaxed because the allocation of risk under the two approaches becomes
a factor in determining their relative desirability. In this section, we demonstrate
that even in the absence of system imperfections the two approaches are not
equally desirable when risk aversion is allowed.
To simplify the analysis (and make it more comparable with previous work),
assume that a pollution event (i.e., a spill or release) either occurs or does not
occur and that if it occurs the damages are equal to d. Assume that the actions
of the polluter affect the probability that an accident will occur. Thus, the function
g(c,a) takes the form
_ 0 with probability 1 - p(a) ,„.
'^ ~ d with probability p(a).
where p(a) is the probability of an accident occurring given a precaution or safety
level a.
Intuitively, the importance of risk aversion in determining the relative desir-
ability of regulation and full liability can be seen by recalling the well-known fact
that risk averse polluters should be willing to pay a premium to eliminate risk.
Thus, if compliance with regulations would absolve them of ex post liability, risk
averse polluters should be willing to be subjected to a regulatory standard that is
more stringent than the level of care they would choose voluntarily under a full
liability system. More specifically, let a be the level of precaution that maximizes
the polluter's expected utility under full liability, i.e. a maximizes EU(a) = 1 -
p(a))U(uo - a) + p(a)U(uo - a - d). Let EU(a) = tJ be the firm's maximum
expected utility under full liability. The firm should then be indifferent between
a full liability system and a policy that couples ex ante payments to victims equal
to the expected value of damages under full liability with a regulatory standard
of s defined by tJ = U(uo - p(a)d - s) where compliance with the regulation is
a sufficient defense against liability. However, if the firm is risk averse then s >
a. The differnce s - a is the risk premium the polluter is willing to pay to get rid
of the risk borne under full liability. Thus, under regulation the victims can get
more prevention for the same "price" (in terms of the polluter's expected util-
ity).'^ However, by choosing regulation over full liability they are also subject to
more risk. This risk is costless if they are risk neutral but not if they are risk
averse. Thus, which of the two alternatives is preferred depends on how the victim
trades off increased risk against increased protection.
To see this more explicitly, consider the Pareto efficient regulatory standard,
a. This is given by the solution to
max EV = (1 - p(a))V(vo -H k) -h p(a)V(vo -I- k - d) (9a)
a,k
subject to U(uo - a - k) >U (9b)
'^ This could be important if policy decisions are made by bargaining in the political arena
and polluters have sufficient political clout to prevent the adoption of policies that would
reduce their expected utility.The Control of Stochastic Externalities 183
where k is a lump sum transfer from polluters to victims. (If the efficient transfer
k were negative, the transfer would be from victims to polluters.) This transfer
represents an ex ante, i.e., state-independent, compensation or indemnification
that keeps the polluter's utility level at U. Note that, if polluters are absolved of
tort liability by compliance with the standard, then under the regulatory approach
they bear no risk. All of the risk is borne by the victim. In thij sense, regulation
is equivalent to a fixed ex ante scheme where the fee is a + k.
Under the alternative policy of imposing full liability without any regulation,
firms would be free to choose their level of precaution. Thus, the level of pre-
caution under full liability solves
max (1 - p(a))U(uo - k - a) + p(a)U(uo - k - a - d). (10)
a
Note that the solution is a function of k, which we denote a*(k). The level of k
necessary to keep the polluter's expected utility at U is then implicitly defined
by
EU = (1 - p(a*(k)))U(uo - k - a*(k))
+ p(a*(k))U(uo - k - a*(k) - d) = U. (11)
We denote this solution k* and the corresponding level of precaution a* = a*(k*).
Since the expected utility of polluters has been held at U under both policies,
we can compare the desirability of the two by comparing the expected utility of
victims. Let V be the victim's expected utility under the efficient regulatory stan-
dard, i.e.,
V ^ (1 - p(a))V(vo + k) + p(a)V(vo + k - d). (12)
and let V* be the victim's expected utility under full liability, i.e.,
V* = V(vo + k*). (13)
Then regulation is preferred to full liability if V > V*, and vice versa.
Result:
(a) If victims are risk neutral and firms are risk averse, then V > V*, i.e.,
victims are better off under regulation than under a system of full liability;'^ (b)
If polluters are risk neutral and victims are risk averse, then V* > V, i.e., full
" This is consistent with Shavell's (1982) result that, when victims are risk neutral and
injurers are risk averse, a first best solution is possible under a negligence standard but
not under strict liability. If a firm is only held liable when it is found to have violated the
due care standard (assumed known by all), i.e., compliance with the standard implies lack
of negligence, then with risk neutral victims the negligence system is equivalent to reg-
ulation requiring the due care level of precaution. Note, however, that Shavell compares
strict liability and negligence to a first best solution that only requires that a resource
constraint be met in terms of expected value, not in each state. Thus, it is not really an
ex post transfer problem such as that considered here, i.e. Shavell's first best solution is
not the Pareto optimal solution in the absence of incentive problems considered above
which implicitly imposes a budget-balancing constraint in each state.184 Kathleen Segerson
liability is preferred; and (c) Risk neutrality for both parties implies that the two
approaches are equally efficient, i.e., V* = V.
These results are consistent with what would be expected from the discussion
in the previous sections, and they are proven in the appendix. However, when
we move away from these special cases and allow both parties to be risk averse,
then unambiguous statements about which policy approach is preferred can no
longer be made even in the absence of system imperfections. The analysis suggests
that something in between full liability and the sole use of regulation, i.e., some
form of partial liability plus regulation, would be efficient.
Summary So Far
If system imperfections (such as evidentiary uncertainty, the difficulty of proving
responsibility, and limitations on recoverable amounts) are ignored, then the
above analysis suggests the following conclusions:
Case 1: Polluters are risk neutral. In this case, both in terms of efficiency and
risk-sharing, a system of full liability is efficient. Large firms may be expected
to be risk neutral with regard to small risks. However, the recent furor over the
shrinking of the pollution liability insurance market suggests that for large envi-
ronmental risks, firms are not likely to exhibit risk neutrality.
Case 2: Polluters are risk averse, victims are risk neutral, and all of the pol-
luter's precautionary actions are observable. In this case regulation alone would
be efficient. The allocation of risk would be efficient, and the correct incentives
could be maintained by setting and enforcing an appropriate regulatory standard.
However, in reality, it is unlikely that victims of environmental damages will be
risk neutral since the losses can be large relative to an individual's income and,
even if government compensation for monetary damages is available, there are
likely to be non-monetary damages that prevent full compensation. In addition,
it is unlikely that all of the polluter's actions that infiuence the probability of a
given magnitude of damages will be able to be controlled through regulations.
Even if firms have safety procedures or equipment designed to reduce accidents,
the care with which these procedures are followed or the equipment maintained
is in general not easily (or cheaply) monitored by the regulatory agency.
Case 3: Polluters are risk averse, victims are risk neutral, and some of the
polluter's precautionary actions are not observable. In this case, sole reliance on
regulation is not efficient (even though it optimally allocates risk) because it does
not provide the correct incentive to undertake unobservable precautionary ac-
tions. Instead, it would appear to be preferable to use a system that couples
regulation with a liability rule under which polluters are liable for something less
than the full amount of damages. Although the use of ex post liability violates
optimal risk-sharing, it is necessary to provide some incentive. In general a system
of fixed apportionment, i.e., liability for a fixed proportion of damages regardless
of their magnitude, is not efficient, although it might be a reasonable approxi-
mation to use in practice.
Case 4: Both polluters and victims are risk averse and all of the polluter's
precautionary actions are observable. The efficient policy in this case would be
similar to that for Case 3, but for different reasons. In general, some combination
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an amount less than the full damages. Here the use of liability is not necessary
for incentive purposes but rather to reallocate risk, i.e., provide some form of
ensured compensation for risk averse victims. The suggested compensation is not
full, however, since full compensation would leave risk averse polluters bearing
too much risk.
Case 5: Both polluters and victims are risk averse, and some of the polluter's
actions are not observable. Again, some form of less than full liability would
appear appropriate. If some of the polluter's actions are observable, then coupling
the liability system with a regulatory program for those actions would improve
the incentive effects without altering its risk-sharing features. This case is perhaps
the most likely case for large environmental externalities. It suggests that the joint
use of regulation and liability to control stochastic pollution events, such as the
combination of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and CER-
CLA to address hazardous waste dangers, is not necessarily redundant. However,
the full liability for clean-up costs imposed by CERCLA may place an inefficient
amount of risk on polluters if firms are also held liable for the full amount of third
party damages under common law.
In each of the above cases, the regulatory or liability policy would in general
require a lump-sum, i.e., state independent transfer between victims and polluters
in order to maintain an acceptable level of expected utility for one of the parties.
(This transfer has been denoted k.) It is an ex ante payment of compensation.
When the payment is from polluters to victims (as might be expected under the
sole use of regulation or less than full liability), it represents ex ante payment for
imposing environmental risks and could take the form of fixed payments to a fund
such as Superfund to be used for clean-up of existing problems. Alternatively,
when the transfer is from victims to polluters (as might be expected under full
liability), it represents ex ante payment for imposing financial risks on firms and
could take the form of cost sharing or tax breaks to reduce the financial burden
associated with taking substantial precautionary actions.
The Role of Insurance
The analysis in the previous sections implicitly assumes that risk averse parties
are unable to transfer risk through the purchase of first party or liability insurance.
In this section we discuss how the existence of private insurance markets to spread
risk would affect those conclusions. The existence of such markets should not,
however, be taken for granted even (or perhaps especially) when risks are very
large. For example, in theory under policies that impose risks on polluters (i.e.
when f'(c) ¥= 0), we would expect liability insurance to be available since risk
averse polluters would generate a demand for it. Recently, however, the market
for liability insurance has nearly collapsed. Thus, although historically they have
been able to do so, risk averse polluters may no longer be able to purchase in-
surance to transfer liability risks, especially those associated with low probability,
high consequence (LP-HC) events. Since the availability of insurance affects the
allocation of risk under the alternative policies, whether or not it exists is an
important factor in analyzing those policies when polluters or victims are risk
averse.
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studied by Shavell (1982). The discussion here draws on some of Shavell's results
and the well-known fact that a risk averse party can improve his welfare by
purchasing actuarially fair insurance. We consider in turn the cases summarized
in the previous section. Table 1 presents a synopsis ofthe results.
Case 1: Polluters are risk neutral. In this case, the possibility of purchasing
liability insurance is irrelevant since risk neutral polluters would have no incentive
to purchase actuarially fair insurance. Full liability is still the efficient approach
in terms of both incentives and risk-sharing. Since victims bear no risk under full
liability, their ability to purchase first party insurance is also irrelevant.
Case 2: Polluters are risk averse, victims are risk neutral, and the polluter's
actions are observable. Again, the availability of insurance does not change the
previous conclusions. Regulation alone is still efficient. Victims have no interest
in insurance because they are risk neutral, and polluters will not purchase any
insurance because they do not bear any risk under regulation.
Case 3: Polluters are risk averse, victims are risk neutral, and some polluters'
actions are unobservable. The fact that some actions are unobservable implies
that liability insurers will be unable to base premiums on the level of preventive
action and as a result moral hazard will exist."* Risk averse polluters would be
expected to purchase less than full coverage for the risks they must bear (Shavell,
1979b). Shavell (1982) has shown that in this case the efficient liability rule is to
either (1) impose full liability on the polluters or (2) prohibit liability insurance
and impose an appropriate level of partial liability. The net effect of these two
alternatives is the same, since under the first one polluters would purchase less
than full coverage, leaving them with the same incentives and risks as under the
second option. (The banning of liability insurance under the second option ensures
that firms cannot further dilute the incentive effects of partial liability through the
purchase of insurance.) In addition, because victims are risk neutral, they are
unaffected by the greater risk they bear under the second option.
Case 4: Both polluters and victims are risk averse, and the polluter's actions
are observable. It is in this case that the availability of insurance has the greatest
potential for improving the outcome since the problem here is only a problem of
risk-sharing and not a problem of incentives. In the absence of insurance, effi-
ciency requires that risk be divided between polluters and victims. However, if
both first party and liability insurance are available, then both victims and pol-
luters can eliminate their risk through the purchase of insurance, and the allocation
of risk becomes irrelevant. If, on the other hand, only liability insurance is avail-
able, then the use of full liability is efficient. Polluters will purchase actuarially
fair insurance to transfer the risks they bear under full liability, but, since their
actions are observable, insurers will base their premiums on those actions and
thus firms will still face the proper incentives. Alternatively, if only first party
insurance is available, then the use of a regulatory approach without liability
shelters polluters from risk, and victims can also avoid risk through the purchase
'"' If accidents occur frequently enough to allow an insurer to distinguish between "cau-
tious" and "careless" firms and firms remain in one category or the other, then experience
rating, i.e., basing premiums on the past record of accidents could be used to reduce the
moral hazard problem. However, this would imply that polluter actions are essentially
observable since they could be inferred from observations on the firm's history of
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of insurance. Thus, in this case, the choice of an efficient policy depends crucially
on the availability of insurance.
Case 5: Both polluters and victims are risk averse, and some polluter actions
are not observable. Here the incentive problems are the same as in Case 3 because
of moral hazard. If both victims and polluters are able to transfer risks through
the purchase of insurance, then the proposed policies are the same as well, i.e.,
either full liability or partial liability with a ban on the purchase of liability in-
surance. However, if risk averse victims cannot purchase first party insurance to
cover the risks they would bear under the second option, then the use of full
liability is the preferred option. Firms would be expected to purchase partial
coverage, which would transfer the risk not borne by polluters from risk averse
victims to a (presumably) risk neutral insurer.
Conclusions and Limitations
Recent events regarding legal liability for damages due to stochastic pollution and
the associated "insurance crisis" suggest that potential polluters exhibit risk aver-
sion with respect to the uncertainty associated with potentially large damages.
Furthermore, it seems likely that in most cases of stochastic pollution some of
the actions of tbe potential polluter that affect the probability distribution of dam-
ages are not easily subject to regulation. When these two conditions exist, the
above analysis suggests the following conclusion: (1) If liability insurance is not
available to transfer risks, then an efficient policy for the control of stochastic
externalities would include the use of both regulation of observable actions and
ex post liability, where the liability would be for an amount less than the full
amount of damages; and (2) If liability insurance is available, then the use of full
liability is efficient since risk-sharing can be achieved through the purchase of
insurance.
There are several caveats to this conclusion that refiect the limitations of the
above analysis. First, as noted previously, imperfections in the regulatory and
liability systems have not been included in the model. However, the results of
Shavell (1948a) and Johnson, Kolstad and Ulen (1986) suggest that inclusion of
system imperfections would not necessarily change the conclusion that the joint
use of regulation and some ex post liability is desired.
Secondly, although the expected utility model used here is the paradigm used
most frequently in economic models of decision-making under uncertainty, it has
been the subject of considerable criticism by many economists, social psychol-
ogists, and decision analysts.'^ The use of alternative paradigms could lead to
different conclusions since the implied perception of risk would be different.
Thirdly, the model used is a short run model that does not capture nonmarginal
adjustments by polluters or victims. To the extent that the different policies imply
different expected costs for either polluters or victims, in the long run they would
be expected to respond accordingly. For example, high expected costs under a
full liability policy might cause individual firms to leave the industry. Alterna-
tively, the prospect of large uncompensated damages might cause victims to re-
locate to areas of lower risk. These non-marginal behavioral responses would
have implications for the long run effect of any policy choice.
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Finally, the static nature of the model,'^ the omission of administrative and
legal costs, and the difficulty of empirically determining the risk aversion char-
acteristics of polluters and victims should be kept in mind when interpreting the
conclusions of the analysis.
Implications for Control of Marine Pollution
The conclusions from the above discussion have implications for the efficient
control of marine pollution. The current approach to controlling stochastic forms
of marine pollution employs a combination of regulation and ex post liability for
damages due to releases of polluting substances. For example, regulations gov-
erning the use of the marine environment for transportation and waste disposal
have been promulgated pursuant to a number of federal statutes, including the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the Clean Water Act, the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act, the Deepwater Port Act, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanc-
tuaries Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Several of
these (Clean Water Act, Deepwater Port Act, and CERCLA) explicitly impose
liability on vessel or facility owners or operators for clean-up costs and damages
to natural resources that result from unauthorized discharges into the marine
environment. However, in the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct,
the total amount of the liability is limited to a specified dollar amount.
The results discussed above suggest that this joint use of regulation and liability
may be justified if the owners/operators of polluting vessels or facilities can un-
dertake actions that affect the probability of a release occurring but are not easily
observable (and thus subject to regulation). In addition, the dollar limits placed
on their liability can be viewed as a means of sheltering risk averse polluters from
some risk, again a goal that is consistent with the above results. However, limiting
risk by putting a dollar cap on liability is not generally an efficient means of risk
allocation.
The use of a liability cap is equivalent to publicly-provided insurance with a
deductible equal to the amount of the cap. It implies a system of full liability for
small damages and partial liability for large damages. Full liability for small dam-
ages is efficient in terms of both risk-sharing and incentives if polluters can be
considered risk neutral with respect to small damages. As noted above, partial
liability for large damages is also efficient if polluters are risk averse with respect
to large damages. However, implementing partial liability through a liability cap
implies that marginal liability is zero beyond the amount of the cap, i.e., f'(c) =
0 for all c in excess of the cap. Since this violates Equation (6), it is not an efficient
way to balance risk-sharing and incentive needs. The analysis suggests that a
preferred approach would be to hold polluters liable for some percentage of dam-
ages once they exceed a certain level. Although theoretically that percentage
should not be independent of the magnitude of damages (unless both U and V
are quadratic), a constant percentage might be desirable in practice because of
its simplicity and the difficulty of determining empirically the precise form of the
optimal nonlinear liability rule. Note, however, that if the polluter becomes very
'* For a discussion of the dynamic nature of the legal system, see Blume and Rubinfeld
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risk averse as damages become very large, then the risk-sharing effects would
come to dominate the incentive effects, and the efficient level of marginal liability
would approach zero as damages increased. This would imply that at some point
a cap on liability might be desirable.
Appendix
1. Claim: If V" = 0 and U" < 0 then V > V*. _
Proof: If V" = 0, then V = 7 for some constant 7 and V = 7-(vo + k -
p(a)d) under regulation. Thus, since V* = 7(vo + k*), it is sufficient to show
that k* < k - p(a)d.
When V = 7, the first order conditions for (9) imply that p'(a)d +1=0 and
thus that a minimizes a + p(a)d. This implies that
a + p(a)d < a* + p(a*)d^ p(a)d < (a* - a) + p(a*)d,
^ k - p(a)d > k - (a* - a) - p(a*)d.
Furthermore, by strict concavity of U,
U[p(a*)(uo - k* - a* - d) + (1 - p(a*))(uo - k* - a*)]
> (1 - p(a*))U(uo - k* - a*) + p(a*)U(uo - k* - a* - d).
Finally,
(1 - p(a*))U(uo - k* - a*)
(A3)
+ p(a*)U(uo - k* - a* - d) = U(uo - k - a)
since both are equal to U by (9b) and (11).
Combining (A2) and (A3) yields
U[uo - k* - a* - p(a*)d] > U(uo - k - a),
and thus, assuming U is monotonic,
Uo - k* - a* - p(a*)d > Uo - k - a
-^ k* < k - (a* - a) - p(a*)d < k - p(a)d
where the last inequality follows from (Al). _ Q.E.D.
2. Claim: If U" = 0 and V" < 0, then V* > V.
Proof: If U" = 0, then U' = p for some constant (3 and by (9b) and (11)
p-(uo - k - a) = p-(uo - k* - a* - p(a*)d)-^k + a = k* + a* + p(a*)d.
^k* = k-(a*-a)-p(a*)d.
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V[(l - p(a))(vo + k) + p(a)(vo + k - d)] > (1 - p(a))V(vo + k)
_ _ _ _ (A5)
+ p(a)V(vo -h k - d) = V ^ V[Vo + k - p(a)d] > V.
Finally, when U' = (3 then from (10) a* minimizes a -I- p(a)d
-^ a* + p(a*)d < a + p(a)d
^ Vo -I- ic - p(a)d < Vo -I- ic - (a* - a) - p(a*)d (A6)
-^ V[vo + i^ - (a* - a) - p(a*)d] > V[vo + k- p(a)d] > V (A7)
where the first inequality assumes V is monotonic and the second follows from
(A5).
Substituting (A4) into (A7) yields
V* = V[vo + k*] > V. Q.E.D.
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